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Abstract
Copyright law originated as a law designed to regulate the commerce of printing, not as a law designed 
to protect the interests of authors. The Statute of Anne changed this by vesting copyright with the 
author and thereby creating the possibility of pre-publication negotiations. Today that bargain is being 
broken. In our era of cloud-computing and Web 2.0, non-author intermediaries provide platforms that 
constitute the tools of authorship, the tools of publicity, and the tools of commercial distribution. Within 
this new ecosystem, we are seeing a return to the model of the Stationers’ Company, where legal power 
over authorial production is vested in the hands of the owners of intermediary technologies. The future 
of digital copyright thus increasingly resembles a return to its early history, as authors play the legal 
role of vassals beholden to the lords of the platforms where they labor.
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Resumen
El derecho de autor nació para regular el comercio de las obras impresas, no para proteger los intereses 
de los autores. El Statute of Anne vino a cambiar esta situación, confiriendo los derechos al autor, lo 
que creó la posibilidad de entablar negociaciones previas a la publicación. Hoy en día, este pacto se 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Lessons from the Virtual Frontier
My recent book Virtual Justice describes the intersection of 
law and virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft and Second 
Life (Lastowka, 2010). The law of these technologies may 
seem like a very specific subject, yet in fact virtual worlds 
are like a small puddle that, when viewed at the right angle, 
reflects a much broader universe. Here I want to describe 
how considering the law of virtual worlds led me to worry 
about the future of copyright law.
While virtual worlds are novel technologies, the way they 
are shaping law is not unprecedented. In Virtual Justice, 
I analogized virtual worlds to castles. Castles were new 
technologies that disrupted society, solved some pressing 
social problems, created new problems, led to new forms 
of culture, and enabled new forms of authority (Janin, 
2004). Castles led to new systems of law: new courts, 
new jurisdictions, new notions of property, and new legal 
framings of relationships. Castles were also a technology 
used by their owners to offer an alternative to the existing 
system of government. The same things might be said of 
virtual worlds. 
Although Virtual Justice touched on many fields of law, I 
avoided one topic until the last chapter: copyright. This was 
not because I thought copyright was unimportant to virtual 
worlds, but because it was too important. Indeed, whenever 
I talked with legal audiences about virtual worlds, it seemed 
someone always asked: “Doesn’t copyright provide the 
answer to the problem you are discussing?” But how could 
copyright “solve” virtual law? The thinking went like this: a 
virtual world is a creative work made of software. Copyright 
accords authors of creative works the power to control the 
disposition of their work. So, just as an author such as J. 
K. Rowling has (in theory) absolute control over the uses 
of her stories, so the owner of a virtual world should have 
absolute control over everything that occurs in the virtual 
environment. All problems are thusly solved.
That reasoning never sat well with me. As a copyright 
specialist, I knew that copyright was not created to be a 
system of governance. So, in my book, I front-loaded the 
many problems in virtual worlds that copyright fails to 
answer. For instance, if an avatar is defamed in a virtual 
world, copyright does not provide a solution to that legal 
problem. Similarly, if two users of a virtual world form a 
contract but are located in distant jurisdictions, copyright 
provides no answer to the jurisdictional problems in that 
situation. Finally, if a hacker writes a malicious piece of 
code that loots the virtual currency in player accounts and 
then sells that currency for a profit, copyright law does not 
address the harm done to the victims of the virtual theft 
or the tax consequences for the hacker of acquiring and 
selling virtual goods. 
In truth, I was so eager to focus on all these problems that I 
spent precious little time talking about copyright in virtual 
worlds. Yet, like the narrator in Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart,” 
I feel my efforts to bury the intersection of copyright law 
and virtual worlds have now made that intersection loom 
large in my mind. I realize I may have overreacted to the 
tendered “solution”—perhaps copyright law is our future 
system of virtual governance?
está rompiendo. En nuestra era de computación en la nube y de la Web 2.0, intermediarios no autores 
proporcionan plataformas que constituyen las herramientas para la autoría, la publicidad y la distribución 
comercial. En este nuevo ecosistema vemos un regreso al modelo de la Stationers’ Company, donde 
las facultades legales sobre la producción de los autores se atribuye a los dueños de las tecnologías 
intermediarias. De este modo, el futuro del derecho de autor en el entorno digital parece cada vez más 
un retorno a su época histórica original, donde los autores juegan el papel de vasallos sometidos a los 
señores de las plataformas en que trabajan.
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1.2. Copyright law in virtual worlds
If you think about it, copyright law permeates all aspects 
of virtual worlds in amazing ways. Consider, if you will, a 
social event held in a real walled garden. As long as no one 
is recording the garden party (a dubious assumption in this 
age of ubiquitous smart phones), the party would have no 
copyright implications. A walled garden – even a very nice 
walled garden – is not subject to copyright protection, I 
would think (Hunter, 2005). 
Now consider a social event held in a walled garden in 
Second Life. A Second Life garden is a synthetic production 
that includes 2D textures, 3D sculptures, animations, 
sounds, computer scripting, and perhaps other creative 
elements. All these elements might be subject to separate 
copyrights. Additionally, once they are merged together, 
these elements are presented to the attendees by the client 
and server software of Second Life, which is protected by 
copyright and must be licensed to be legally loaded onto 
a user’s computer. 
Attendees themselves are garbed in copyright. To construct 
their social selves in Second Life, they use copyright-
protected components and merge their own creative labor 
with them to fabricate copyright-protected bodies adorned 
in copyright-protected clothing, moving via copyright-
protected animations. 
If, during the Second Life event, attendees express 
themselves in this walled garden – if they chat, draw, 
philosophize, move objects about – those contributions 
may also fall within the ambit of copyright. To the extent 
that more sophisticated tools (e.g. embedded video) are 
provided, as they are in Second Life, these may invoke even 
more concerns about copyright. What I found in my study of 
virtual worlds is that when one puts people together online 
in a tool-rich environment, the result is essentially an artist’s 
colony. People will talk by making things and socialize by 
collaborating on authorial projects (Benkler, 2006).
And here’s the curious part of the copyright story: most of 
the copyright-protected content created by users will be 
owned (or at least licensed) by the platform on which the 
users create. In some cases, platforms may even require 
the assignment of the user’s copyright interest. This fact 
dawned on me toward the end of Virtual Justice, leading 
me to conclude the book on this note:
“Virtual worlds are often rich and complex artistic creations, 
so their protection under the aegis of copyright is certainly 
deserved. In the case of the user, however, copyright law 
is more often perceived as a source of risk that needs to 
be defused and harnessed in ways that serve the interests 
of those who are monetizing the platforms. Like peasants 
tilling fields around a medieval castle, users will lend their 
copyright labor and creativity in ways that build the value 
of the virtual world platform, often paying for the privilege 
to do so.” 
1.3.  Broadening the frame:  
User-generated content
Of course, virtual worlds are hardly the only places where 
people create content online. In many online communities 
today, we see exactly the same sorts of sharing, creating, 
and entertaining taking place. For instance, take all 
the photography posted on Flickr. Recently, the Dutch 
photographer Erik Kessels created an installation in which 
he printed out all the photos uploaded in one day on Flickr. 
The piles were huge. Just seeing them, one realizes the 
impossibility of ever looking at a full day’s output of Flickr. 
Apparently, as of 2011, six billion photographs had been 
posted to Flickr. Similarly, YouTube proudly proclaims that 
over 4,000 minutes of video are uploaded every minute. It 
is impossible for anyone to watch even one percent of the 
content YouTube is hosting.
While these statistics are mind-boggling, consider all the 
other forms of content created and shared online: Twitter 
tweets, blogs, recipes, lolcats, open-source software, music, 
fan fiction, knitting patterns, home remedies, law review 
articles, even simple web pages. 
And, of course, there is Facebook. Apparently, three billion 
new photographs are uploaded to Facebook every month, 
making it more than a rival for Flickr. Facebook is not a virtual 
world as I define that term, but it certainly does consist of 
people trying to socialize by expressing themselves and 
entertaining each other with new content. 
What do we make of this? So far, it seems the law pays very 
little attention. The traditional copyright industries have 
very little to gain from engaging with the phenomenon 
of user-generated content, and those are the industries 
that employ lawyers. To the extent attention is paid, it is 
largely negative. If it does nothing else, amateur creativity 
interferes with how the entertainment industry views itself. 
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Critics like Andrew Keen, Mark Helprin and many others have 
warned that the growing wave of user-generated content 
undermines the cultural status and economic model of 
professional creators (Keen, 2008; Helprin, 2009).
In the copyright industry model, the public consumes the 
content sold by those who pay creative professionals. This is 
how copyright law works today. However, the user-generated 
content model is different, since so much of it is produced 
without the expectation of profit. This shift is significant, 
because if consumer attention remains a constant, industrial 
copyright should anticipate a diminished role in culture. The 
audience will entertain itself. It may even pay to entertain 
itself. And this creates a business opportunity for the 
platforms – virtual worlds, Flickr, YouTube, Facebook, and 
many, many others – that provide tools, host content, insert 
advertisements, track user behaviors, and search for other 
ways to monetize their position.
1.4. User-generated content and copyright law
For the time being, I will remain agnostic about the normative 
valence of user-generated content. Some people, such as 
Andrew Keen, present it as a cultural apocalypse, while 
others herald it as the dawn of a new age of participatory, 
peer-produced, many-to-many, remix, prosumer, free wiki, 
crowdsourced culture (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 2008; Shirky, 
2010). As more moderate voices have explained, it’s likely a 
little bit of both. I will not attempt to delve into that nuance here.
What I want to state is that this shift toward amateur 
creativity is incredibly important—culturally. Economically, 
user-generated content seems to be quite important in the 
aggregate, though obviously if we take the individual pieces 
we’re seeing, each individual work seems economically very 
unimportant. The average Flickr photo, the average YouTube 
video, the average blog post or Second Life skin or Minecraft 
world, isn’t making any money at all. Copyright lawyers are 
not going to get rich any day soon from representing UGC 
creators. If copyright lawyers don’t see potential for lawyerly 
employment with regard to these works, the odds are they 
don’t see much copyright law in these works either. 
The legal money in digital copyright today is spent shaping a 
new set of laws for online piracy, not a new set of laws for user-
generated content. The divorce between digital technology 
and the means of creative production is generating a lot 
more noise than this strange new and harmonious marriage. 
But I worry that when we focus exclusively on new laws 
to stop piracy, we miss something vital about the shift in 
copyright. This emerging maelstrom of human creativity 
is the true genius of the Internet and the true source of 
its economic value. We’re still in the very early stages of 
harnessing its power and peculiar characteristics. The law 
should be paying more attention to how copyrights – even 
these “marginal” copyrights – are being affected by the shift.
2. Whither authors?
2.1. The historic purpose of copyright
Copyright, as we all know, was a law that responded to 
a particular technology of reproduction. And the first 
response, in England at least, was one that enabled 
a powerful commercial guild, the London Stationers’ 
Company, to exercise a monopoly power over “copy right” 
that had little to do with the goal of protecting the rights of 
creative authors (Lowenstein, 2002; Patterson, 1968; Rose, 
1993). The contemporary system of copyright in the United 
Kingdom, and in the United States by later adoption, is a 
system that originated from the Statute of Anne, which 
ostensibly amended that pre-existing “copy right” to create 
a right for authors, not publishers.
However the law was created, according to some, it was 
primarily a political strategy by the Stationers’ Company 
to perpetuate the monopoly that it had earlier enjoyed. 
The history is complex and not entirely clear, but it is 
commonly accepted that the practical origins of copyright 
law in the English and American systems had little to do with 
providing economic rewards for creativity. Nevertheless, we 
consistently declare today that the law of copyright is about 
rewarding authors, not intermediaries.
Could it be that Web 2.0 is turning back the clock? I worry 
that this might be the case. With respect to virtual worlds 
and other platforms, copyright seems to be transforming 
into a tool aimed at authors and designed to harvest their 
labor. This is particularly true with regard to the ever-
growing cornucopia of amateur creativity. To illustrate this, 
I want to talk about four cases that sit at the intersection of 
user-generated content and copyright law. The first two of 
these cases – the two I discuss at greater length in the last 
chapter of Virtual Justice – involve virtual worlds.
These are, I admit, rather strange cases. Three out of the 
four involve companies fighting over the legality of user 
behaviors despite the fact that the users are not parties 
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to the litigation. But I think these cases do suggest that 
platforms may be in the process of forming of a new legal 
status quo with regard to user-generated content—a status 
quo we should find troubling. 
2.2.  Marvel v. NCSoft:  
Copyright as a limit on creativity
City of Heroes was a virtual world that offered players, 
as the title suggests, the ability to become a superhero. 
One of the game’s main selling points was a tool set that 
allowed players to design their own superhero costumes. 
Indeed, some people played City of Heroes primarily to use 
this “Character Creation Engine.” They played primarily by 
making new costumes and showing them off during fashion 
contests in the virtual world. But copyright law made this 
tool problematic. Marvel Comics, the owner of the X-men 
and other superhero intellectual properties, alleged that 
users were making avatars that resembled Marvel-owned 
characters. So Marvel sued the game creators, NCSoft and 
Cryptic Studios, for enabling City of Heroes players to create 
infringing superheroes. 
The defendants attempted to dismiss the case, arguing that 
there was no way that providing creative tools to game 
players could constitute copyright infringement. However, 
the Marvel case survived that motion to dismiss, and the 
parties later entered into an undisclosed settlement. 
The Marvel case might seem, at first glance, similar to other 
cases involving platforms, like Napster or YouTube, where a 
defendant is hosting material that infringes copyright law. 
Hosts of online content are regularly dragged into disputes 
between their users and copyright owners. In most cases in 
the United States, the safe harbor provision of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act can be invoked to avoid liability. 
If the intermediary follows proper procedures and removes 
the infringing content upon receiving notice, infringement 
liability can be avoided. 
However, the City of Heroes case was somewhat different. 
The defendants did not just host the content claimed to be 
infringing. They provided the tools players used to create 
that content. And the players did not just create atomistic 
pieces of content that were uploaded to the servers of the 
defendants. They used the defendant’s highly customized 
software to make avatars that were consistent with the 
defendant’s world and which were viewed by other players 
within the context of the virtual world. 
The Marvel v. NCSoft case illustrates several points. First, 
we can see that certain forms of authorship today can be 
enabled and hosted by online platforms in more complex and 
unprecedented ways—the player authors here were clearly 
building out the value of the platform in a novel way. Second, 
it is notable that the avatars created – some of which Marvel 
claimed infringed copyright law – were created without any 
expectation of commercialization. Indeed, according to the 
terms of service on the defendants’ site, the copyright in 
the player creations was owned by the defendants, not the 
players. Third, Marvel’s suit against the defendants did not 
just threaten to prevent players from creating copyright 
infringements. It also threatened to remove their ability to 
create non-infringing content.
It seems odd to think that copyright could be used as a 
means to keep certain creative tools out of the hands of the 
public, but that’s exactly what Marvel’s lawsuit threatened to 
do—and perhaps could have done if the case had not settled. 
Is removing creative tools from the hands of the public a 
proper function of copyright law? I would argue that it is 
not—the Marvel case is therefore problematic as a harbinger 
of copyright’s intersection with user-generated content.
2.3.  MDY v. Blizzard Entertainment:  
Copyright as governance
The MDY v. Blizzard case was recently litigated in California 
and it concerned creativity within another virtual world: 
World of Warcraft. Michael Donnelly is a computer 
programmer who wrote and sold a program called Glider. 
Glider functioned to automate avatar activities in Warcraft. 
So, for instance, if you wanted your avatar in the game 
to mine the landscape for precious metals, Glider would 
automate that process for you, allowing you to sleep while 
your avatar labored for hours on end. 
Because some player tasks in World of Warcraft, like mining, 
can be both profitable and boring, Glider was a popular 
program. Donnelly’s company actually made millions of 
dollars in sales. Surely a contributing factor for this success 
was that some of the profits of mining and other repetitive 
activities could be translated into real world profits. So those 
in the business of gold farming (selling virtual goods for real 
money) likely constituted a substantial portion – though 
certainly not all – of Donnelly’s customers. 
For a variety of reasons, Blizzard was not enthusiastic about 
commercial gold farming or avatar automation. The primary 
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rationale given by the company was that Glider ruined the 
environment of the game for players. So Blizzard threatened 
to sue Donnelly if he did not cease selling the software. 
Donnelly instead preemptively filed suit against Blizzard, 
seeking a declaration that his business was legal. 
Among the counter-claims Blizzard brought against Donnelly 
were two copyright-based claims. First, Blizzard argued that 
when players engaged in “botting” with the Glider software, 
this was a violation of its terms of service and its end-user 
license agreement. It followed that because players used 
the game’s software pursuant to a copyright license, these 
contractual breaches could put botters outside the scope 
of the license, hence triggering copyright infringements. 
Essentially, Blizzard was attempting to use copyright law 
as a means to specify what players could and could not do 
while using its software. 
Blizzard’s second copyright-based argument was that the 
Glider software, by evading the detection of Blizzard’s 
anti-botting software, granted players access to the 
copyright-protected work of Blizzard. Blizzard had, in fact, 
attempted to use a piece of software, Warden, to detect 
those players who were using Glider software and to prevent 
them from accessing Blizzard’s service. However, Donnelly 
had managed to rewrite Glider to avoid detection by the 
Warden program. 
To make its claim, Blizzard relied on the 1998 Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (the DMCA), a law that prohibits 
the circumvention of digital rights management technologies 
to obtain access to works protected by copyright. Blizzard 
claimed that by selling a botting program that evaded 
Warden, Donnelly had trafficked in circumvention tools in 
violation of the DMCA. 
The district court ruled in favor of Blizzard on both copyright 
claims. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed with regard to 
the first claim, explaining that the anti-botting contractual 
provision was directed at setting rules of game play and was 
not intended by the parties as a copyright-related restriction 
on use of the software. However, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the infringement ruling with respect to the circumvention 
of the Warden anti-botting software. 
This short description does not do justice to the difficult 
issues in MDY, but my purpose here is not to lay out the 
doctrinal complexity of copyright law and licensing. I simply 
want to point out the strange way that copyright law was 
applied in this case. Copyright is supposed to encourage 
the development of new creative works and to prevent 
others from copying and performing those works. In the 
MDY case, the alleged player infringers were simply users 
of the software who acted in a manner the virtual world 
owner disfavored. The goal of the case was to prevent the 
distribution and use of a creative piece of software that 
served the needs of a market and which did not duplicate 
the copyright-protected work. 
In other words, the MDY case shows that my instincts about 
the nature of copyright law may have been wrong. Copyright 
may indeed be a law of community governance.
2.4. Power Ventures: Copyright as walled garden
My third example concerns a lawsuit brought by Facebook 
against Power.com, a now-defunct company that at one time 
offered users a means to access various social networking 
services from a single platform. In order to aggregate 
various forms of user data across platforms, Power.com 
asked users to authorize it to access their accounts on 
various platforms.
Power.com initially sought to negotiate with Facebook to 
obtain access to user accounts, but the negotiations were 
unsuccessful. Ultimately, Facebook attempted to block 
Power.com’s access to the platform in much in the same 
way that Blizzard attempted to block MDY’s Glider from 
interacting with World of Warcraft. And just as MDY sought 
to evade blocking, so Power.com developed strategies to 
evade Facebook’s blocking efforts. Like Blizzard, Facebook 
brought claims under copyright law and the DMCA against 
Power.com. 
What was curious about the Power.com case is that Facebook, 
unlike Blizzard, is primarily in the business of providing a 
platform for users who share information. Facebook is 
not a content provider, it is a conduit for content. There 
is very little visible authorial creativity on the Facebook 
website beyond the content added by users. In its complaint, 
Facebook failed to specify what work copyright Power.com 
had infringed by accessing the platform. Despite this, when 
Power.com moved to dismiss Facebook’s claims, the court 
sided with Facebook. It stated: “Facebook owns the copyright 
to any page within its system, including the material located 
on those pages besides user content, such as graphics, video 
and sound files. Defendants need only access and copy one 
page to commit copyright infringement.”  
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Additionally, the court found credible Facebook’s claim 
that its own users had violated its copyright by authorizing 
Power.com to access the Facebook site. It stated that if the 
facts alleged by Facebook were true, “When a Facebook 
user directs Power.com to access the Facebook website, 
an unauthorized copy of the user’s profile page is created. 
The creation of that unauthorized copy through the 
use of Defendants’ software may constitute copyright 
infringement.” Thus, again, users of a platform – users who 
actually create the valuable content on the platform – were 
found to be potential infringers of copyright law by virtue of 
the copyright interest held by the platform. Copyright law 
was once again flipped against the users who provided the 
creativity that made the platform valuable. 
2.5. Turnitin: Copyserfs
My last case, A.V. v. iParadigms, is perhaps slightly less 
strange than the prior cases in that the user-creators who 
were not present in the prior cases were the plaintiffs in this 
one. Copyright law is supposed to work this way-creators 
are supposed to pit themselves against putative infringers. 
What made this case unusual, however, was that the platform 
owner, in this case a company named iParadigms, argued 
that it had a right to commercialize copyright-protected 
works without needing to compensate the authors of those 
works. The authors had not volunteered to allow iParadigms 
to do this; they were students who wrote papers for their 
high-school classes and were required by their school to 
submit their work to the defendants’ for-profit service. The 
function of Turnitin brings to mind the censorial goals of 
the copyright system in the 17th century: student papers 
were checked for plagiarism and then added to the Turnitin 
database to detect potential future plagiarism.
If the students failed to use the defendants’ service, they 
would receive a zero grade for their paper assignments, 
so their educational success was conditioned on waiving 
their authorial rights. In order to use the service, the 
plaintiffs were required to submit to the terms of service 
of the Turnitin website by clicking an “I agree” button. The 
students submitted the papers, as they were required to do, 
but they (inventively) included “disclaimers” stating that 
they did not consent to the defendant platform’s archiving 
of their works. Nevertheless, the works were added to the 
defendants’ commercial database. 
So the students turned to copyright law for protection. They 
lost. 
The court found that the unauthorized use of the students 
work did not amount to copyright infringement. It found that 
Turnitin’s contractual terms barred their lawsuit – despite the 
fact that the students were required to submit their papers in 
order to receive a passing grade, and despite the fact that the 
students were minors and presumably incapable of entering 
into a contractual assignment of their authorial interests. 
The court also found that the use of the student papers in 
a for-profit plagiarism detection service was a “fair use” 
that fell outside the scope of the plaintiffs legal control. 
Finally, it found plausible the claim by iParadigms that, by 
accessing its services in a manner that exceeded the scope 
of the license agreement, the students might have violated 
federal criminal law.
Some commentators viewed the Turnitin case as a victory 
for fair use in copyright law. Here, though, I simply want 
to note how, once again, a platform successfully divested 
creators of their intellectual property rights, and profited 
by doing so. 
Where is copyright law headed?
2.6. Conclusion 
Four cases may not constitute a trend in the law. My concern, 
however, is that amateur authors using Web 2.0 platforms 
will have negligible authorial rights. This is a problem—
or at least it should be. Copyright, after the era of the 
Stationers’ Company, was supposed to be a law protecting 
authors and giving them new leverage against information 
intermediaries. What we are seeing emerge with respect to 
the Web 2.0 era is something much more like the copyright 
law that preceded the Statute of Anne. 
Copyright may be becoming a law that primarily benefits 
publishers at the expense of the authors. Indeed, three of 
these cases managed to exclude the creative public from 
the litigation entirely, while at the same time framing them 
as copyright infringers. While I first spotted this trend in 
virtual worlds, it seems to characterize all platforms that 
host popular creativity.
Online, it seems copyright is losing sight of the author and 
transforming itself into a law of intermediary privilege. The 
future of copyright may well be the past.  
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